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This article analyses defence and security spending (DSS) in
Colombia, on the assumption that in order to gain a better
idea of the effect of such spending on economic growth and
the public finances it would be desirable to analyse its inter-
nal composition, since this would make it possible to infer its
impact on the production of defence and security. In order to
do this, various theories on the repercussions of military ex-
penditure are reviewed and defence and security spending in
Colombia is analysed on the basis of information from the
Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic. The effi-
ciency of spending on the armed forces and the National Po-
lice is then examined, especially as regards the relations
between combat and support and attack and defence, and it is
shown that the military forces need to be reorganized. In the
conclusions, various ways of securing savings on the defence
budget are proposed. The most important of these are con-
nected with personnel management, as payroll expenses rep-
resent 73% of total spending. The proposals made in this
respect are to modify the system of pay and allowances, in-
crease the retirement age, reduce the number of personnel
and restructure the proportions between combat forces and
support and administrative personnel.
I
Introduction
The armed conflict in Colombia has given rise to dis-
cussions about defence and security spending (DSS).
Those in favour of such spending consider that DSS is
vital for strengthening the Public Forces, that im-
proving the security forces of the State increases the
likelihood of consolidating a climate of peace and
tranquillity in which the rights of the individual pre-
vail, and that it has a positive influence on demand
and employment. Its critics, on the other hand, argue
that DSS is unproductive, that rather than improving
the social environment it limits the public resources
available for investing in areas with a greater social
impact, and also that Colombia is making a dispro-
portionate economic effort because of the current
armed conflict.
Although these propositions are based on appar-
ently incontrovertible assumptions, we will neverthe-
less try in this article to analyse the underlying
postulates. We will begin by summarizing the debate
on the effects of DSS on the economy. The basic
premise of those who believe that DSS is unproduc-
tive is that any outlay in this field has negative effects
on the economy and also displaces resources which
would otherwise generate greater value added. In or-
der to determine if the rationalization of DSS really
gives a “peace dividend”, however, we must first
know what impact that spending has on the economy.
In order for the rationalization of DSS to make eco-
nomic sense, the benefits generated by the saving on
DSS for different areas of security must be greater
than the impact of DSS itself.
It may be gathered from the international studies
made on military spending1 since the 1970s that the
results on this matter are not conclusive. It must be
borne in mind, however, that the debate on the opti-
mum level of DSS is not an abstract exercise, because
in the final analysis the economic resources used are
the means selected for achieving an objective
through military action. It is therefore necessary to
compare the repercussions in terms of security with
the financial and economic consequences of the ex-
penditure.
The analysis of the situation of Colombia is
based on the widely held view that the effort made
by Colombia to deal with the armed conflict is dis-
proportionately large. To a large extent, this view
may be due to the growing feeling that the country’s
objectives in terms of security seem increasingly far
off, while the financial, economic and social re-
sources devoted to their pursuit are ever greater.
However, it is not enough merely to analyse DSS in
the light of its possible impact on the State finances.
In the final analysis, it is the internal composition of
that spending which can enable us to infer its real ef-
fect on the production of defence and security, which
is its ultimate objective. Examining this aspect will
give us a sounder basis for our macroeconomic anal-
ysis.
We will therefore make a detailed examination
of DSS in Colombia, on the basis of the reports of the
Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic.
This information breaks down the resources into op-
erating expenses and investment: that is to say, out-
lays on the pay and pensions of both the civil and
military personnel in question, general expenditure,
and outlays on military and police capital formation.
In the specific case of Colombia, this item is called
Expenditure on the Public Forces (EPF). This cate-
gory covers all the expenditure on the military forces
(including the functioning of the Ministry of Defence
and other agencies involved in defence projects) and
the expenditure on police forces and auxiliary mili-
tary forces organized in the event of conflict. The
aim of breaking down EPF in detail is to determine
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1 In this article, military spending is equated with defence and
security spending (DSS) and expenditure on Public Forces
(EPF). This is because since 1950 the budget of the National
Police is incorporated in the budget of the Ministry of Defence
and, according to the definition of military spending used by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is the defi-
nition we have followed here, the police carry out activities
which require resources typical of such spending.
the line it has followed in Colombia, for which pur-
pose its past behaviour is studied and its structural
and conjunctural components are identified.
It is also noted that the costs in this sector can
only be reduced if changes are made in personnel
management and the administration of physical re-
sources. Improving the way the Public Forces oper-
ate would make it possible to increase their capacity
to provide defence and security. The microeconomic
analysis made of the sector provides an opportunity
to explore possible options for making EPF redound
in higher levels of defence and security and to deter-
mine how far it can be reduced while making it more
efficient.
II
Theoretical analysis of the economic
impact of military spending
Since 1973 there has been a strong ongoing contro-
versy about the impact of military spending on eco-
nomic growth. Some circles maintain that such
spending is unproductive, arguing that all outlays in
this field have negative effects on the economy and
limit the resources available for investment in areas
that provide greater social benefits. Others, however,
believe that military spending favours economic
growth insofar as it makes a significant contribution
to increasing national production capacity.
Those who argue that there is a negative relation
between military spending and the economic and so-
cial development indicators assert that although such
expenditure is a necessary strategy for the capitalist
system it has an adverse impact on the growth rate
because it leads to lower levels of investment.
Recent studies have been investigating the
macroeconomic effects of military spending in the
less developed countries and have found that it ad-
versely affects growth, the balance of payments
current account, saving and investment. A significant
difference has also been observed between the level
of military spending of military dictatorships and
that of civilian governments. The studies conclude
that if the security of a nation depends on economic
growth, then expenditure on its military forces only
seems to be buying insecurity and underdevelopment
(Smith, 1977; Deger, 1986; Nabe, 1983; Ball, 1983;
Leontief and Duchin, 1983; Pivetti, 1992).
Most developing nations have considerable diffi-
culty in balancing their fiscal resources while trying
to meet the growing demands of their costly armed
forces. Thus, according to some analysts, a kind of
military Malthusianism has been growing up: a con-
frontation between small annual increases in fiscal
resources but soaring increases in defence costs. In
many countries, the cost of providing the military ap-
paratus exceeds their capacity of payment. For many
reasons, a vicious circle has been forming since the
1970s: as the military bureaucracy grows, militarily
useless but increasingly costly equipment is ac-
quired, crowding out social expenditure and public
investment and ultimately reducing the well-being of
the population, while because of their lack of techni-
cal and economic capacity the armed forces find it
difficult to provide real defence against outside
threats, so that their central role shifts to internal re-
pression and control of the friction between civil and
military elements caused by the reduction in
well-being, which finally leads to a further increase
in military spending. This process generally takes
place in the less developed countries (Scheetz,
1991).
In contrast, the authors who have been maintain-
ing that the higher a country’s military spending, the
greater its economic growth, believe that such spend-
ing can be economically productive if it leads to a
situation of national security and allows for the more
effective exercise of property rights, thus stimulating
private investment and hence growth. They also note
that spending on military capital formation can have
productive effects: some developing countries are
still benefitting from transport and communications
facilities constructed for military purposes.
It has thus been maintained that military spend-
ing is an item capable of providing food, lodging,
medical services and training to a number of persons
who would otherwise have to be maintained by the
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civilian sector; that –as already mentioned– it can
bring forward the execution of a wide range of pub-
lic works which also benefit the civilian economy,
and that it can cover various special forms of scien-
tific and technological development which would
otherwise have to be carried out by the civilian sec-
tor of society (Benoit, 1973; Thompson, 1974;
Frederiksen and Looney, 1982).
Finally, while it may be noted that individual
studies on the effect of military spending on eco-
nomic growth come to apparently contradictory con-
clusions, Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley conclude
that –whatever the samples used, the periods ana-
lysed, or the econometric methods employed– the
models based on the influence of demand generally
hold that military spending crowds out investment
and therefore has a negative effect, whereas the stud-
ies centered on supply aspects generally find that the
effects are positive or neutral. This leads them to
conclude that the net impact of military spending on
growth is only slightly negative, so that the reduction
of military spending alone is not a desirable way of
speeding up economic growth (Sandler and Hartley,
1995, especially p. 220).
III
Hypothesis
The study of military spending is of interest to a
number of different disciplines because of its effects
on the level of public expenditure and on economic
growth. In times of peace, or at least when the sur-
vival of values and institutions does not depend on
massive use of the military apparatus, the idea is that
macroeconomic considerations should govern the
discussion on the desirable and possible level of
military spending: that is to say, such controversies
are settled in the final analysis by fiscal capacity.
It is worth exploring the reasons why the analysis
of such spending is of interest, however. For econo-
mists, it is of great importance because of its impact on
growth and on the macroeconomic variables. For those
who make public decisions, it is essential to study this
spending because of its effects on the public finances
and the crowding out of resources that it can cause in
other areas of central government expenditure. Few an-
alysts have focussed on the true justification for mili-
tary expenditure, however: the capacity to provide
defence and security.
In view of the foregoing, discussions about the
proper level of military spending cannot be produc-
tive unless they take microeconomic aspects into ac-
count. Study of the composition of military spending
makes it possible to infer its real impact on the pro-
duction of defence and security, while at the same
time giving a more concrete basis on which to carry
out the macroeconomic analysis; it is also of funda-
mental importance for determining future trends in
military spending. If this expenditure consists mainly
of payments for the remuneration of personnel, then
the possibilities of reducing it go down. The opposite
is true, however, in the case of investment and opera-
tional expenditure. We thus see that the possibility of
making changes in military spending is inversely
proportional to the proportion of payroll costs and di-
rectly proportional to operational and investment
costs.
Study of the evolution of military spending in
Colombia reveals that its cycles of expansion and
contraction are the result of transitory equipment ac-
quisition programmes, while salary increases and
reclassifications raise expenditure levels and make
them difficult to reduce. Consequently, fiscal adjust-
ment programmes affecting the military sector risk
weakening its operational capacity: the discretionality
of the expenditure may mainly affect the investment
and operational items and thus give rise to an imbal-
ance between military personnel and the material
resources available to it.
Therefore, although it is extremely important to
analyse the impact of military spending on the eco-
nomic growth and public finances of a country, such
analysis will be insufficient if it does not take ac-
count of the internal composition of the expenditure,
for it is this structure which makes it possible to infer
the effect that the expenditure will have on the econ-
omy and the possibilities of reducing it and making it
more efficient, while at the same time evaluating the
effect this will have on the provision of defence and
security.
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IV
Defence and security spending
1. Past behaviour
A review of expenditure on the Public Forces (EPF)2
in Colombia from 1926 to the present shows that on
average the economy has devoted 1.8% of GDP to se-
curity, with a minimum of 0.5% in 1930 and a maxi-
mum of 3.6% in 1997 (figure 1). This evolution shows
a cyclical pattern of expansion and contraction of the
security budget, with however an upward trend over
the period. A more detailed analysis (table 1) shows
that in the late 1920s this expenditure averaged 0.7% of
GDP. This level was maintained up to 1932, the year
before the border dispute with Peru broke out. This
conflict brought EPF up to one of the highest levels reg-
istered by the country: around 3%. Afterwards, over a
period of four years, this expenditure was brought
down to less than 1.5% of GDP. This shows that al-
though the external conflict made necessary a big ef-
fort, this was due to transitory factors which permitted
it to be rapidly reduced later (figure 1 and table 1).
In the 1940s, a somewhat remarkable situation
prevailed: although the Second World War was tak-
ing place elsewhere, in Colombia the level of expen-
diture on the Public Forces, as a percentage of GDP,
was below its historical trend level. Only towards the
end of that decade and the beginning of the 1950s
was there a renewed substantial increase in EPF,
which rose from less than 1.1% of GDP to over 2.1%.
This period coincided with important domestic events,
such as the period of unrest known as “La Violencia”,
due to conflicts between the political parties, and the
1953-1957 military dictatorship of General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla.
Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1950s the
growth of EPF had dropped back to levels close to the
historical average. In the 1960s there were moderate
increases, but in 1971, with the acquisition of Mirage
warplanes and automatic weapons, EPF rose to over
3% of GDP: higher than during the conflict with Peru.
Subsequently, even though relatively substantial
amounts of military equipment were acquired in the
1970s, average spending dropped back again to
levels below the historical average.
The purchase of Urutú and Cascabel armoured
vehicles, the construction of the Bahía Málaga naval
base on the Pacific coast of Colombia and the run-
way of the Marandúa air base in the eastern low-
lands, together with the acquisition of missile
corvettes in the first half of the 1980s, raised the
level of spending, but only slightly above the aver-
age. The acquisition of Kfir warplanes gave rise to
the last increase in the 1980s, but even so the growth
rate of expenditure was below the trend level.
The 1990s marked the beginning of a new pat-
tern of behaviour of EPF in the country. With regard
to investment, the Five-Year Plan was begun in 1991,
supplemented with phases I, II and III of the Energy
Protection Plan. The first of these plans set investment
priorities, with emphasis on maintenance programmes,
in order to improve the readiness and operational
quality of the Public Forces. The different phases of
the Energy Protection Plan, for their part, were
aimed at organizing volunteer military units3 to pro-
tect the oil and electricity sectors. The “Commotion
Plan” and the “Integral Plan” were also put into effect,
in 1992 and 1993, to counter the permanent offensive
of the guerrilla and develop an integral war strategy
to respond to the disturbances caused by the various
outlaw groups. The resources provided for in these
plans were for maintaining and renewing military
equipment and making up shortcomings in this respect,
improving the mobility of the troops, especially
through the use of helicopters, and modernizing com-
munications between the different government bodies,
the military forces and the National Police.
With regard to operational expenditure, the
above programmes meant the activation of a substan-
tial number of units and the incorporation of a con-
siderable number of personnel. Priority was also
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2 This expenditure corresponds to the amount allocated by the
central government to the Ministry of National Defence, includ-
ing both the resources allocated to the military forces and those
for the National Police. This means that it does not take account
of the contributions made by departmental, district or municipal
governments, aid from other countries, or private-sector contri-
butions. 3 Paid non-conscripted soldiers.
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given to increasing the budgets for general expenditure
(especially the purchase of equipment and supplies),
strengthening intelligence activities, developing health
services and improving field rations. Lastly, with re-
gard to personal services and transfers, pay and pen-
sions, Law No. 1992/4 was passed, placing the pay of
members of the Public Forces on the same footing.
Finally, in 1997 the economy made its biggest
effort in this sector since 1926. This was due to two
factors: the structural upward trend in operating ex-
penses as a result of the levelling of rates of pay in
1992, and the investment resources obtained through
the Security Bonds. These bonds, also known as War
Bonds, were designed in general to meet the main
needs facing the sector within the framework of a
counter-insurgency strategy centered on three areas:
mobility, intelligence and communications.
The evolution of EPF as a percentage of GDP in
the past enables us to infer its probable evolution in
the future. It should be noted first of all that through-
out the twentieth century (excluding the War of a
Thousand Days, a civil war which took place be-
tween 1899 and 1902) EPF has displayed an oscillat-
ing but generally upward trend. Its variations can
largely be explained by conjunctural factors such as
conflicts or tensions with neighbouring countries,
particular acquisitions of high-cost equipment or in-
stallations, or action to deal with subversion and drug
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FIGURE 1
Colombia: Economic effort in the defence sector, 1926-1998
TABLE 1
Expenditure on the Public Forces (EPF)
as a percentage of GDP, 1926-1998















1926-1931 Period leading up to war
with Peru 0.6
1933-1934 War with Peru 3.0
1939-1947 Second World War 1.1
1948-1952 “La Violencia” 1.3
1953-1970 Rojas and the National Front 2.0
1993-1998 Levelling of rates of pay 3.1
Source: Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic and
calculations by the authors.
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trafficking. This pattern showed a turning point in
the early 1990s, however, when the levelling of the
pay of active and retired members of the Public
Forces added an upward structural component to EPF.
2. Effects of expenditure on the Public Forces
After having verified the historical behaviour of EPF,
it is vitally important to determine its main effects on
the economy. Analysis of the EPF/GDP series shows
an upward trend throughout the period from 1926 to
1998 (figure 2). It is estimated that the Public Forces
increased their annual expenditure by 0.023% of
GDP. It is important to note that overall central gov-
ernment expenditure (CGE) shows the same type of
behaviour: according to preliminary calculations, its
average annual increase was 0.156% of GDP. Central
government expenditure for other purposes (CGEOP),4
which excludes the defence sector, grew by 0.134%
of GDP annually.
At first sight, the difference between the slopes
would appear to indicate that defence sector expendi-
ture is skewed in comparison with central government
expenditure for other purposes. If we compare the aver-
age annual growth rates of these series, however, we
see that this is not so. As a proportion of GDP, EPF grew
by 1.532%, while CGE and CGEOP grew by 1.250%
and 1.245%, respectively (table 2 and figure 3).
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FIGURE 2
Colombia: Weight of defence sector and
central government in the economy,a 1926-1998
a EPF = Expenditure on the Public Forces; CGE = Central government expenditure; CGEOP = Central government expenditure for other
purposes.
TABLE 2
Colombia: Estimated growth rates of expenditure
on the Public Forces (EPF) and central government
expenditure (CGE), as percentages of GDP
(Annual averages)
1926-1998 1926-1979 1980-1998
EPF/GDP 1.532 1.777 3.531
CGE/GDP 1.250 0.761 3.824
CGEOP/GDP a 1.245 0.642 3.873
EPF/CGE 0.284 1.016 -0.294
CGEOP/CGE -0.003 -0.119 0.049
Source: Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic and
calculations by the authors.
a CGEOP = Central government expenditure for other purposes
(excludes EPF).
4 This expenditure also displays an upward trend, although more
fluctuating, as a proportion of GDP (5.6% in 1950 and 20.8% in
1997).
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This is explained by the fact that, on average, the
government allocated more resources to the defence
sector than to the other sectors. The average growth
rate of EPF in central government expenditure was
0.284%, while that of CGEOP was -0.003%5 (figure 4).
From the behaviour of the relation EPF/CGE, it may
be inferred that the defence sector is a restriction for
CGE, because it is observed that when extra resources
were allocated for non-military sectors EPF also in-
creased its share of central government expenditure.
This would explain the growing share of CGE in GDP.6
If the central government had kept its share of
GDP constant (at 11.26%, for example), then in 1998
CGEOP would have been 7.8% of GDP, not 20.9%,7
but as the central government has been taking on
greater responsibilities it has had to appropriate more
resources from the economy.
What causal relation exists between EPF/GDP and
CGEOP/GDP? Causality tests in the Granger sense
show that CGEOP/GDP causes EPF/GDP directly
(CGEOP/GDP is non-stationary and has a growth
trend). Also, CGEOP/CGE (with a negative trend)
causes EPF/GDP (inversely). However, there is no
causal relation between CGEOP/GDP and CGEOP/CGE.8
Furthermore, when we analyse the average
shares of either of these two variables by decades we
see that there is a replacement effect.9 Examples of
this are seen in the 1930s, 1950s and 1970s (table 3).
In the 1960s to the 1990s there is a complementation
effect: both variables grow, but at different rates,
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 9 • D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 9172
FIGURE 3
Colombia: Economic weight of defence sector and
central government expenditure for other purposes, 1926-1998 a
a EPF = Expenditure on the Public Forces.
CGEOP = Central government expenditure for other purposes.
5 Causality tests show that CGEOP/CGE causes (inversely)
EPF/GDP.
6 Or, on the contrary, the defence sector would be a guarantor
of the new expenditure.
7 As long as the EPF/CGE, EPF/GDP and CGEOP/CGE series
are stationary -that is to say, they vary around the mean, or tend
to be self-correcting- the CGE/GDP and CGEOP/GDP ratios
have a root of 1 (they are random walks and their variances tend
to infinity, making it difficult to model them).
8 This analysis is not fulfilled for the subperiod 1980-1998,
since the trend of CGEOP/CGE changes to a growth trend
(maintaining the indirect relation), so that EPF should have re-
duced its share in GDP.
9 A replacement effect is an inverse relation between the vari-
ables.
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which thus affect their shares in central government
expenditure. This can only happen if the central gov-
ernment appropriates more resources from the GDP.
a) Present composition of expenditure
In the 1980-1998 period, the main component of
EPF (45.2% of the total) was the “personal services”
item, corresponding to payment of the personnel.
The “transfers” item accounted for 26.2% and corre-
sponds basically to payments in respect of social
security, pensions10 and severance benefits. The
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FIGURE 4
Colombia: Expenditure on the Public Forces (EPF) as a
percentage of central government expenditure (CGE), 1926-1998
a CGEOP = Central government expenditure for other purposes.
TABLE 3
Colombia: Behaviour of expenditure series for central government
(CGE), Public Forces (EPF) and other purposes (CGEOP), by decades
(Percentages)
Decades EPF/CGE % variation EPF/GDP % variation CGE/GDP % variation CGEOP/GDPa % variation
1920s b 7.6 0.7 8.7 8.1
1930s 17.3 127.5 1.5 124.2 8.2 -6.2 6.7 -16.8
1940s 12.4 -28.0 1.1 -25.9 8.9 8.3 7.8 15.8
1950s 21.1 70.1 1.8 67.4 8.8 -0.2 7.0 -9.7
1960s 20.0 -5.6 2.0 11.1 10.3 16.3 8.3 17.7
1970s 15.3 -23.1 1.9 -7.7 12.0 17.1 10.2 23.2
1980s 14.7 -3.9 2.0 7.7 13.6 13.3 11.6 14.4
1990s c 13.8 -6.5 2.8 38.5 20.2 48.2 17.4 49.9
Source: Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic and calculations by the authors.
a CGEOP = Central government expenditure for other purposes (excludes defence).
b 1926-1929. c 1990 - 1998.
10Allocations to retired personnel.
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“general expenditure” item accounted for 14.8% of
the total and covers the acquisition of goods and ser-
vices needed to ensure the operation of the sector,11
and finally “investment” accounts for 13.8% of
total expenditure.12 We thus see that the remunera-
tion of active and retired personnel (personal ser-
vices and transfers) represents 71.4% of total
expenditure (table 4). The increase in the personal
services item reflects the increase in the number of
personnel, which grew by an average of 4.2% per
year between 1980 and 1998 while the population
only grew by an average of 2%, so that a larger per-
centage of the population now forms part of the
Public Forces (435 soldiers for every 100,000 inhab-
itants in 1980 and 641 in 1998).
Furthermore, in 1992, with the levelling of rates
of pay and the amounts set aside for the payment of
severance benefits, there was a considerable increase
in expenditure on personal services and transfers.
This was reflected in a restructuring of EPF, with
investment being the variable most affected.13
All the foregoing was reflected in an increase in
the resources allocated for the sector (figure 5),
which, after having been 2.1% of GDP in the
1980-1992 period, rose to 3.1% in 1993-1998 (3.6%
in 1997). Before the levelling of rates of pay, 1.4%
of GDP went for the payment of active and retired
personnel, 0.3% for Public Forces operations, and
0.3% for the purchase and maintenance of equipment
(a total of 2.1%). In the 1993-1998 period, however,
these values went up to 2.3%, 0.5% and 0.4%, re-
spectively (a total of 3.2% of GDP).14
In 1997, 3.6% of GDP went to the Public Forces,
broken down as follows: 2.4% for payment of per-
sonnel, 0.5% for operations, and 0.7% for invest-
ment. It is expected that in the future this sector will
receive still greater resources from the economy,
amounting to between 4.1% and 5.3% of GDP15 in
200516 (figure 6).
b) Fiscal restrictions of the central government
With the 1991 administrative decentralization it
was expected that the central government would be
freed from direct responsibilities, so that its level of
expenditure would go down. Contrary to what had
been expected, however, the new commitments im-
posed on it by the 1991 Constitution caused the cen-
tral government share in GDP to increase
considerably, reaching 24.5% in 1997 (or 17.9% if
debt service is excluded). Such an increase is not a
good thing for the economy, and it needs to be re-
duced in the short term.17
If the defence sector does not change its behav-
iour (figure 7), then very soon the central govern-
ment will have to devote a growing proportion of its
expenditure to it (up to 17.2% in 2002).18 This means
that the economy will only be able to allocate a max-
imum of 3.5% of GDP19 (figure 8). Between this be-
haviour and the projection of EPF there is a growing
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TABLE 4
Colombia: Composition of expenditure
on the Public Forces
(Percentages)
Remuneration
Period of active and Operations Investment
retired personnel
1980-1998 71.4 14.8 13.8
1980-1992 70.0 13.8 16.4
1993-1998 72.9 15.8 11.3
Source: Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic and
calculations by the authors.
11 A discussion is currently under way in the country as to
whether this investment increases the gross capital formation of
the economy. In this study it is considered that the combination
of the military equipment factor (arms, aircraft, field hospitals,
etc.) and the human factor generates the product which satisfies
the defence and security demands of society.
12 Investment has a similar weight to that of general expenditure
in most years.
13 In 1997, the resources supplied to this sector by the War
Bonds were equivalent to 1.45% of the regular budget for that
year.
14 Although greater resources have been allocated to the sector
overall, the “general expenditure” and “investment” items have
each fluctuated between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP.
15 Two econometric models were applied in which the GDP
(lagged by one and four years) is the explanatory variable.
16 Using an analysis based on a long-term series, this range in-
creases to 6.7% and 6.8% of GDP.
17 In the following analysis it was assumed that the level of
CGE would go down by 4 percentage points of GDP in the next
three years.
18 EPF was projected by applying the error correction mecha-
nism model to the differences between the logarithms of the
variables and the adjustment coefficient of the cointegration
equation (see the statistical and econometric annex).
19 It should be noted that this level of expenditure as a propor-
tion of GDP cannot be maintained over time because it would
mean constantly reducing the share of central government ex-
penditure in the economy, until a point where that expenditure
would go exclusively to the defence sector.
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FIGURE 5
Colombia: Share of expenditure on the Public Forces in GDP, 1980-1998
Personal services Transfers General expenditure Investment
FIGURE 6
Colombia: Past evolution and future projections of expenditure
on the Public Forces (EPF), as a proportion of GDP, 1980-2004
(Short-term analysis)
Years
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FIGURE 7
Colombia: Past behaviour and future estimates of expenditure on the
Public Forces (EPF), as a proportion of central government expenditure (CGE),
in the event of a cut in CGE as a proportion of GDP, 1980-2002
Years
FIGURE 8
Colombia: Behaviour of central government expenditure (CGE)
and expenditure on the Public Forces (EPF), as proportions of GDP,
in the event of restriction of central government expenditure, 1980-2005
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deficit calculated at 0% to 0.1% of GDP in 1999,
0.1% to 0.3% in 2000, 0.2% to 0.6% in 2001, and
0.4% to 0.8% in 2002.
From the econometric standpoint, there is evi-
dence of causality between GDP and EPF. In addition,
the long-term models reflect a direct relation, al-
though this causality is not fulfilled inversely. It may
be deduced from these results that EPF does not gen-
erate growth of GDP, but on the other hand it cannot
be asserted that a reduction in EPF will bring an in-
crease in GDP.
As mentioned earlier, the factor which has deter-
mined EPF growth in the past has been the purchase
of equipment and installations: that is to say, the ad-
justment variables of the Public Forces budget have
been the investment and general expenditure items.
At the same time, it may be noted that although there
has been an increase in the proportion of GDP de-
voted to EPF, these particular items have remained
within relatively narrow margins. Consequently, if
the growing share of payroll expenses is combined
with less than proportional growth of total expendi-
ture, the space for investment may become increas-
ingly small in the future.
Thus, if a ceiling is fixed for EPF as a proportion
of GDP, the internal dynamics of expenditure will
cause payroll expenditure to crowd out investment, if
the share of general expenditure in GDP remains con-
stant.
These results highlight the need to make funda-
mental reforms in the defence sector in order to help
reduce central government expenditure. In view of
the fact that every year more personnel are incorpo-
rated into the sector, which naturally calls for more
resources, then if the present trend continues the per-
centage of GDP devoted to the Public Forces will only
cover the pay and pensions of their active and retired
personnel.
V
The efficiency of military spending
Analysis of the internal composition of EPF in Co-
lombia shows that the present structure of the Public
Forces needs to be reviewed for reasons of effi-
ciency. The plans and programmes carried out in the
past were generally aimed at providing more of “the
mixture as before”. This has had macroeconomic
repercussions because there has not been a policy
on expenditure which has made it possible to keep
EPF within fiscally sustainable limits.
However, rather than going more deeply into the
possible impact of military spending on the econ-
omy, what is vitally important is to go more deeply
into the present cost structure of the country’s de-
fence and security apparatus. As already noted, the
monetary resources allocated to the sector are not
necessarily reflected in greater capacity to provide
security. Although the sector represents quite a heavy
budgetary burden for the State, its functions are be-
ing limited by its own internal structure. Thus, in or-
der to understand the dynamics of the sector and its
macroeconomic repercussions, it is essential to ana-
lyse the microeconomic aspects of EPF.
In view of this, it would be desirable to begin
the cost reduction process by making changes in the
areas of personnel management and administration
of physical resources. Above all, it is necessary to
examine the defence and security sector by consider-
ing two aspects of fundamental importance for de-
ciding on lines of action. The first, which is of an
organizational nature, is the ratio of operational per-
sonnel to administrative and support personnel. The
second, which is a matter of implementation, is the
way the action of the Public Forces is applied. These
two aspects determine the possibility of strengthen-
ing these forces in a context of fiscal constraints.
The combat/support ratio represents the number
of men needed to provide support for one single sol-
dier in a combat area. In Colombia, there are cur-
rently approximately eight support personnel for
each combat soldier. If this ratio were substantially
modified, the Public Forces would work more effi-
ciently. International parameters indicate that this ra-
tio should be around 3:1. A lighter and faster-moving
structure would make it possible to increase fighting
power.
The structure of the sector therefore needs to be
reappraised. The decisions taken to reduce the ad-
ministrative personnel (to a support/combat ratio of
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3:1, for example) can be of two types, which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. On the one hand, the
decision could be taken to apply a policy of reduc-
tion of the number of personnel, leading to a reduc-
tion of the administrative component of military
units and a change in the officer/soldier ratio. This
option could reduce the direct costs of military
forces, but would not necessarily mean an increase in
fighting power; moreover, it would involve greater
indirect costs, because it would lead to the early re-
tirement of pensionable personnel and it would be
necessary to provide incentives for voluntary resig-
nation or, at least, some viable mechanisms to link
up with the labour or educational markets.
On the other hand, it could be decided to carry
out a process of reorganization within the Public
Forces. This would make it possible to at least dou-
ble their fighting power with the same personnel.
This would create a more efficient structure and re-
duce the growth rate of the number of personnel, at
least in the medium term, which would be more in
keeping with the macroeconomic fiscal constraints
referred to earlier.
Let us now consider the attack/defence ratio,
which is the ratio between the attacking and defend-
ing forces. Some of the main signals received by Co-
lombian public opinion regarding the public order
situation are reports of guerrilla attacks on isolated
military posts, ambushes of patrols, and the occupa-
tion of towns or villages. These incidents summarize
the military interaction between the Public Forces
and the guerrilla. These kinds of armed encounters
could therefore serve as a unit of analysis for gaining
a realistic idea of the confrontation between the regu-
lar forces and the subversives.
If we compare the total number of men in the
subversive groups and in the Public Forces, the
balance of power would appear to lie with the latter.
However, this ratio of numbers of men is no use for
an objective analysis, since the combats are never be-
tween the whole of the Public Forces and the whole
of the guerrilla. Guerrilla war consists precisely of
avoiding a confrontation of this type. Consequently,
the ratio of forces must be determined in the con-
text of isolated combats preferred by the subver-
sives. In these, we have seen that the guerrilla
usually has greater fighting power than the Public
Forces, which shows the ineffectiveness of the
policy of maintaining a dispersed presence of the
latter in areas of conflict. Rather than showing
their presence, the Public Forces should concen-
trate their efforts on making preparations so as to
ensure that they have a fighting potential greater
than that of the illegal armed groups in these iso-
lated areas, either by becoming more effective in
defence or developing a suitable structure for at-
tack. The decision to pursue one or the other of these
objectives will depend on the region where the forces
are operating, the support given by the community,
and the type of outlaw armed groups present in the
region.
In order to improve the combat/support ratio
and modify the defence/attack ratio, it is clear that
it is not necessary to increase the number of per-
sonnel, but to reorganize the existing ones. This
calls for decisions on two fronts: a change in the
present structure of the Public Forces so that there
are more combat personnel, and a change in the pres-
ent attack/defence ratio in order to establish strong
points, either as a defensive force or as an offensive
one. Past experience has shown that the political
need for the Public Forces to show themselves
throughout the national territory has been militarily
inefficient and economically unsustainable.
The restructuring of the personnel of the Public
Forces is a sufficient condition for reducing the pres-
sure of this sector on fiscal resources (efficiency) and
a necessary condition for improving results in the
military field (efficacy). It will not be possible to im-
prove the results unless the provision of equipment is
reviewed also. It is not a question of acquiring more
of the same kind of equipment, but of providing the
personnel with the right equipment for the present
type of combat. This improved provision of equip-
ment must take place both in the operational and the
support areas, because if this is not done it will be
more difficult to transfer support personnel to com-
bat duties.
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VI
Conclusions
Analysis of the dynamics of military spending in Co-
lombia reveals that although the State has devoted
relatively few resources to national defence in the
twentieth century as a whole, this expenditure in-
creased significantly in the 1990s. Yet if we consider
the principles that should justify such spending, it is
clear that the Colombian Public Forces are not
achieving their objectives in terms of internal secu-
rity.
The Colombian State is faced with the need to
improve the efficiency of the Public Forces for pro-
viding citizens with security, while at the same time
reducing the cost structure of these forces. These ob-
jectives may seem contradictory, but it is politically
and militarily essential for the Public Forces to re-
cover their monopoly of the use of arms and it is eco-
nomically indispensable that they should do so with
a more rational cost structure. If this is not done, EPF
will be truly unproductive, as the deterioration of the
country’s democratic institutions will continue and
there will be serious imbalances in the State finances.
In the present article, we maintain that it is not
enough simply to analyse the macroeconomic impact
of a society’s expenditure on defence and security. It
is essential to go further and analyse the detailed
composition of that expenditure, in order to provide a
real basis for both macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic analysis. The present composition of this ex-
penditure in Colombia gives grounds for thinking
about the difficulties that may be encountered in try-
ing to reduce it.
It can be argued that it is little use having the
public finances in order if society itself is not like-
wise in order. In Colombia, with the current form of
expenditure on the Public Forces, it is not likely that
the legitimacy of the State can be consolidated, but it
is very likely that there will be a deterioration in the
public finances. The projection of expenditure on the
Public Forces for the immediate future reveals an ex-
plosive rate of growth which would bring it to over
5% of GDP by the year 2005.
Such results are incompatible with the required
readjustment of the public finances, which calls for a
radical reduction in central government spending in
the short term. The present structure of expenditure
is not compatible with sound fiscal policy. On the
other hand, fixing a ceiling on the percentage of GDP
to be devoted to the Public Forces does not represent
an efficient solution to the problem of the growth in
EFP unless reforms are also made in its internal dy-
namics; as we saw earlier, the upward trend in this
expenditure, due to payroll-linked factors, would
crowd out investment and operating expenditure to
such a point that the available resources would only
cover pay and pensions. A measure that would in-
deed generate savings in the budget of the Ministry
of National Defence, however, would be the adop-
tion of reforms in the following areas: i) the dynam-
ics of the budget and the process of acquisitions, and
ii) management of personnel and physical installa-
tions.
The most significant savings in the defence sec-
tor are necessarily associated with personnel man-
agement. Expenditure on this item accounts for 73%
of defence and security spending. It is therefore es-
sential to undertake a review of the whole personnel
management system. In this respect, consideration
could be given to such measures as: i) modifying the
system of pay and allowances; ii) increasing retire-
ment age; iii) reducing the number of personnel, and
iv) changing the ratio between combat forces and
support and administrative personnel.
Modifying the system of pay and allowances is
the most radical recommendation, since it would in-
volve the incorporation of Ministry of National De-
fence personnel into the general social security
system. Although it would be the most direct solu-
tion to the structural problem, it is also the most un-
likely, because of its inherent political difficulties.
Reduction of the number of active personnel through
early retirement programmes is the most viable op-
tion. It is also imperative to improve the ratio be-
tween combat forces and support and administrative
personnel, since this is the easiest way of increasing
fighting power with the current number of personnel.
In order to solve the personnel problems it will
be necessary to take very far-reaching decisions,
each of which will have profound political, military,
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economic and social repercussions. The adoption of
any of these decisions will depend to a large extent
on such broad considerations as the state of the econ-
omy, the political climate, public opinion or the pre-
vailing security situation. Nevertheless, these
problems must necessarily be tackled and settled in a
clear manner, for the sake of the security and eco-
nomic welfare of the country.
The problem deriving from the internal conflicts
in the country will not be solved by reducing the
budget of the Ministry of National Defence. It is an
inevitable fact that military spending will continue to
exist and that internal security and external defence
will continue to require resources that must be pro-
vided. The country is investing in this just as a citi-
zen invests in an insurance policy. Consequently, the
coverage must be effective and must be as broad as
possible.
In this article we have pointed out that, because
of the present cost structure of the country’s security
and defence apparatus, increasing the monetary re-
sources allocated to it is not necessarily reflected in
greater capacity to provide security. There are many
areas where ways of multiplying the effect of each
peso invested in national security could be explored.
Coming to grips with the conflict, however, requires
a strong political will and a determined attitude on
the part of society at large, as well as the availability
of material and financial resources.
(Original: Spanish)
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Annex. Statistical and econometric results
FIGURE A1
Colombia: The Public Forces, as a proportion of population and GDP, 1950-1998 a
Source: Office of the Comptroller-General of the Republic of Colombia.
a PFG = Expenditure on the Public Forces as a proportion of GDP (EPF/GDP).
SXM = Soldiers per 10,000 inhabitants.
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